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HARVEY C. MANSFIELDt
UPON what criteria shall the Interstate Commerce Commission act in
fixing minimum rates, below which a railroad's charge for its service
will be regarded as unlawful? Though this question had often been
argued before the Commission in the years since 1920, it was not pre-
sented to the Supreme Court in a general form until the 1934 term,
when it was raised in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. United States1
and summarily dismissed in a decision that was overshadowed in public
interest by the contemporaneous argument and decision of the Schechter
case.2 The question promises to grow in importance as other forms of
transportation, less subject to Commission control, undermine further the
monopoly position to which the railroads have until recently been accus-
tomed. The importance of these competing transportation services will
focus increasing attention upon the lower instead of the upper lawful
limits of the rate structure.' The power to fix minimum prices is the
power to protect a vested interest against the consequences of competi-
tion, justified in a dynamic society only.by a greater public advantage
in stability than in change.
Railroad rate structures, so the texts tell us, were built up largely
by applying two "principles," the cost of the service to the carrier, and
the value of the service to the shipper (or "what the traffic will bear"),
both loosely defined concepts at best.4 Within the broad zone thus
defined, the general level of rates on any particular commodity tends
toward the lower limit of cost where the shippers have some definite
bargaining advantage over the carriers, and toward the top when carriers
dominate the market, the common situation historically, but the rarer one
today. For many commodities, such as coal, grain, cotton and lumber,
the chief problem is to adjust the rival interests of a number of railroads
tAssistant Professor of Government, Yale Univetsity.
1. 295 U. S. 476 (1935).
2. 295 U. S. 495 (1935).
3. The standard texts give scant attention to minimum rates except in connection
with the removal of discrimination. LocxL=, Ecoxoirncs or TRANSPORATIox (1935)
316-317; MLLER, INLAND TRANSPORTATION (1933) 226-227; RiPLEY, RAIROADS (1927)
625-626; JoNEs, PRICIPLEs oF RAILWAY TRANSPORTATION (1927) 552; DAGoETr, PRINMcLES
oF INLAND TRANSPORTATION (1934) 846. The best discussion is in 1 SHARMAN, TUE
INTRSTATE COmweRCE CoLmmnsiO N (1931) 197-301, 3B SIMiAMAN, T E INTERSTATE
COlnRCE Co ssiox (1936) 626-656; and in Bik6, Power of the Interstate Commerce
Commission to Prescribe Minimum Rates (1922) 36 HARv. L. REV. 5.
4. See texts, supra, note 3. Experience has amply shown that neither carriers nor
shippers act consistently as "economic men" in rate making.
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and a much larger number of shippers, the latter geographically scattered
and obliged to sell their product competitively (i.e., at an equalized price)
in a few major consuming markets. The typical solution of this problem
for the great basic commodities is a rate structure based upon so-called
"key-rates" between the consuming centers and each of the major pro-
ducing areas. Rates to the same markets from other points of origin
are determined by adding or subtracting arbitrary amounts, called differ-
entials, to or from the relevant key rate. Differentials in effect measure
the' terms upon which shippers outside the principal areas of supply can
compete in the principal markets. The adjustment of key rates is pri-
marily a matter of carrier competition; the fixing of differentials more
often reflects the rivalries of shippers. Characteristic also of such struc-
tures is a blanketing of numerous points of origin and of destination
under single rates-a comprorise between the desire for equalization
of rates on the postage stamp theory, and the demand of shippers favor-
ably located that their geographical advantages be recognized.
Rate structures of this sort have a high degree of rigidity. The
general increases and decreases in rates of the past two decades have been
applied to them not in percentages, but in flat amounts of so many cents
per ton throughout, so as not to disturb the differential adjustments.
Nevertheless, disputes over the fairness of the adjustments are continuous,
as shippers or railroads who find themselves losing out, attempt to better
their positions. It is lower rates they want, and to the extent they suc-
ceed in getting them their competitors are under pressure to do likewise.
Every attempt at reduction may therefore be expected to provoke opposi-
tion. If the railroads can not, or do not resist the pressure for reductions,
inevitable in this situation, and in comparable ones arising in other areas
of competition, when, and upon what grounds, should the Commission
intervene to exercise its authority to ix minimum rates?
The theory of rate-making assumed that the self-interest of railroads
would ordinarily prevent rates from falling below what was described
without precision as cost; and the framers of the original Interstate
Commerce Act certainly assumed that if such did not always prove to
be the case, there was still no occasion for governmental action to save
the carriers from their own folly. There was never any doubt that the
command in that act that all rates shall be "just and reasonable" was
not intended to confer on the commission a power to set minimum ratesYr
The need for such a power, however, appeared early in the Commis-
sion's experience, not only in the inability of the railroads to protect
5. See ANN. REP. I. C. C., 1888, 19-24; Commissioner Cooley's able discussion in Re
Chicago, St. P. & K. C. Ry. Co., 2 I. C. C. 231 (18ss); review by Brandeis, J., in
Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. United States, 249 U. S. 557, 565 (1919).
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themselves against cut-throat competition, but also in the interests of ship-
pers who otherwise had no adequate protection against discrimination.
6
Other reasons appeared in the course of time but the movement to give
the commission a minimum rate power made headway slowly. The
Hepburn Act in 1906 cured the defects in the Commission's power to
fix maximum rates for the future,7 but it was not until the Transportation
Act of 1920 that Congress was induced to grant a direct power to fix
minimum rates.8 The notion that a low rate was not always a good
in itself died hard.
It is true that prior to 1920 the Commission had certain indirect means
at its disposal for preventing some rate reductions. To correct unlawful
rates, as defined in the first four sections of the Act, two principal
remedial powers were conferred in addition to the control over maximum
rates: first, a power to cure discriminations by ordering a carrier, in the
alternative, either to raise a preferential rate or to lower a prejudicial
one, or to do both,' and second, a power to suspend proposed rates before
they took effect, to be followed by cancellation if they were found to be
unlawful.' Both means of control could be used, in effect, to fix minimum
rates." The suspension power, in particular, has been, and still is a
potent weapon for achieving that .end. When proposed rates are sus-
pended the burden is placed upon the carrier to justify them." The
suspension and cancellation of proposed reductions operates as a minimum
order, especially when a proviso is added to the Commission's order,
that "this is without prejudice to the filing of rates not lower than those
specified in the report herein." The increase in carrier competition since
1920 is strikingly evident in the corresponding increase in the number of
reductions suspended and cancelled, as shown in the following table:
6. See ANiw. REP. I. C. C., 1893, 38-39, 217-225; id., 1898, 23, 26; Har'lan, Commr.,
dissenting in Western Rate Advance Case, 35 I. C. C. 497, 681 (1915); Galloway Coal
Co. v. Alabama G. S. Rr. Co., 40 I. C. C. 311, 315 (1916); Hearings on Exleusic of
Tenure of Government Control of Railroads, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. (1919) 234.
This inability to control discrimination effectively resulted from a doctrine known as
the Ashland rule. See note 21 infra.
7. 34 STAT. 589 (1906), 49 U. S. C. A. § 15 (1) (1926).
8. 41 STAT. 484 (1920), 49 U. S. C. A. § 15 (1) (1926).
9. 24 STAT. 384 (1887), 34 STAT. 589 (1906); 36 STAT. 551 (1910), 49 U. S. C. A.
§ 15 (1) (1926).
10. 36 STAT. 552 (1910), 49 U. S. C. A. § 15 (7) (1926) (The Mann-Elkins Act).
11. For an early example see Suspension of Rates on Packing House Products, 21
I. C. C. 68 (1911). Instances since 1920 of reductions suspended and cancelled without
specifically invoking the minimum rate power are numerous, e. g., Lake Cargo Coal from
Kentucky, 139 I. C. C. 367 (1928); Coal from Illinois to Keokuk, Iowa, 210 I. C. C.
395 (1935).
12. By contrast the burden of proving unlawfulness in established rates rested on the
complainant, or on the Commission, if the ptoceedings were begun on its own motion.
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SUSPENSIONS OF PROPOSED RATES REQUESTED OF =hE I. C. C.1a
Year Increases Reductions Both Neither Total
1921 401 43 - - 444
1926 560 83 - - 643
1931 228 125 60 26 439
1932 278 253 73 22 626
1933 172 245 25 19 461
1934 178 201 34 20 433
1935 194 123 34 1 352
Thus, even in the face of two major efforts to raise the general level
of freight rates during the depression years,14 localized reductions have
been offered right and left, for, reduced rail traffic means reduced railroad
bargaining power. And in granting or refusing these reductions, the
Commission must formulate its criteria for fixing minimum rates.
Similarly, the control of rates under the long-and-short-haul clause
involves the setting of minima.' The Commission has discretionary
power to grant or deny relief from the fourth Section. 10 When relief is
denied, the minimum charge for the long haul is thereby set at the level
of the maximum for any intermediate haul. 7 When relief is granted, the
degree of the departure allowed again fixes a minimum for the long haul.
Here again, there has been a significant increase in the number of appli-
cations for fourth Section relief, and a glance at the current volumes of
the Commission's reports indicates that continued increases are likely
13. ANN. Rm. I. C. C., for the years given, pp. 39, 45, 65, 85, 71, 75, 91, recpcctively.
14. lFfteen Per Cent Case, 1931, 178 I. C. C. 539 (1931), 179 I. C. C. 215 (1931),
191 I. C. C. 361 (1933); Emergency Freight Charges, 1935, 203 I. C. C. 4 (1935). A
united request of large shippers' organizations for a general reduction in all freight rates
was also denied. General Rate Level Investigation, 1933, 195 I. C. C. S (1933).
15. 24 STAT. 380 (1887), 49 U. S. C. A. § 4 (1) (1926). For examples of minimum
rates fixed by setting limits to permitted departures from fourth section, see Commodity
Rates to Pacific Coast Terminals, 32 I. C. C. 611, 629 (1915); Sugar Cases of 1933,
195 I. C. C. 127 (1933); Export and Import Rates to and from Southern Ports, 205
I. C. C. 511 (1935), modified 210 I. C. C. 525 (1935); Rates from and to Pacific Coast
Territory 210 I. C. C. 575 (1935); Sugar from California to Chicago, 211 I. C. C.
239 (1935).
16. Railroad Commission of Nevada v. Southern Pacific Co., 21 I. C. C. 329 (1911),
aff'd, Intermountain Rate Cases, 234 U. S. 476 (1914).
17. For instances of reductions denied because they would violate this section, see Trans-
continental Cases of 1922, 74 I. C. C. 48 (1922); Coffee from New Orleans, 182 L C. C.
453 (1932).
Another deterrent to reductions, which may operate to ffic minima, is found in
§ 4 (2), that if a railroad reduces a rate on account of water competition, the rate may
not thereafter be raised except upon some change in conditions other than the elimination
of the water competition. This was to prevent railroads from reducing rates drastically
for a temporary period in order to drive a water carrier out of business.
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unless the current effort to repeal the long-and-short-haul clause should
prove successful."'
Again, in exercising control over intrastate rates under the Shreveport
doctrine,19 later written into the Transportation Act as Section 13, the
Commission has acted, mainly on grounds of discrimination, to set the in-
terstate level as a minimum for intrastate rates.20  Finally, in putting into
effect, a Commission order enforcing the prohibition in Section 3 against
undue preference and prejudice, the carrier often found, even when an
alternative order was issued, that in practice it had to raise the preferred
rate to the level of the one that occasioned the prejudice, which thereupon
became the minimum.
It was in the effort to cure discrimination, however, that the want of
a direct power to fix minimum rates was most acutely felt by the
Commission. In Ashland Fire Brick Co. v. Southern Railway,21 Section
18. For the last three years the number of cases in which the Fourth Section was
involved has averaged 335 annually, of which about four-fifths were decided favorably
to the carriers. ANN. REP. I. C. C. (1933) 72; id. 1934, at 76; id. 1935, at 92. The
figures are about double those of ten years previous.
A bill to repeal the Fourth Section was introduced by Rep. Pettengill, with the backing
of railway managements and labor, and passed the House this spring. It was opposed
by the Commission and did not emerge from the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee
during this session. For a comprehensive discussion of the Fourth Section, see Comment
(1936) 45 YALE L. J. 1426.
19. Houston, E. & W. T. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342 (1914). Note that
one of the jokers in the Motor Carrier Act, 49 STAT. 543, 49 U. S. C. A. § 302 (1935),
a political concession to aid its passage, expressly repudiated the Shreveport rule, leaving
the Commission powerless to raise intrastate motor carrier rates on account of discrim-
ination against interstate commerce, 49 STAr. 559, 49 U. S. C. A. § 316 (e) (1935).
George, The Federal Motor Carrier Act of 1935 (1936) 21 Come. L. Q, 249, 272.
20. The successive phases of the Commission's administration of this power, and the
criteria upon which it has acted are discussed in 2 SnAarMAN, INTERSTATE CotM.rnc=
Coi.rissoN (1931) 269-307, and Comment (1934) 44 YALEa L. J. 133. Cf. Ohio v. United
States, 292 U. S. 498 (1934) ; Intrastate Rates on Bituminous Coal in Illinois, 182 1. C. C. 537
(1932). The refusal of state commissions to follow the Commission's action in Emergency
Freight Charges, 208 I. C. C. 4 (1935) has led to another series of cases The state
commissions were upheld in Emergency Freight Charges, 210 I. C. C. 289 (1939) (Minne-
sota); 210 I. C. C. 541 (1935) (Indiana); 211 1. C. C. 23 (1935) (Oklahoma); 211
I. C. C. 219 (1935) (Arkansas); 211 I. C. C. 225 (1935) (Kansas); 211 1. C. C. 499
(1935) (Louisiana); 213 I. C. C. 130 (1935) (Idaho). But in 213 I. C. C. 249 (1935)
(Utah); 213 I. C. C. 563 (1936) (Georgia), and 214 I. C. C. 129 (1936) (Minnesota),
the surcharges were imposed, the last mentioned case reversing the previous year's deciion.
Some of the Minnesota surcharges were given up, on the carriers' motion, as soon as they
were obtained, to avoid loss of traffic to trucks. 215 I. C. C. 314 (1936).
21. 22 I. C. C. 115 (1911); Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 289 U. S. 627
(1933); cf. Eau Claire Board of Trade v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 5 I, C. C. 264
(1892); 3B SHAizrxm", op. cit. supra note 3, at 636-650; LocICrN, op. cit. supra note 3,
at 527; Comment (1933) 43 YALE L. J. 297; Comment (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 692. In
the principal case the Southern Ry., participating in hauls from Ashland, Ky., and from
St. Louis to a common market in Birmingham, Ala., was held not liable under § 3 for
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3 had been interpreted so as to fit the definition of what could be regarded
as unlawful discrimination to the character of the remedies then available
to the Commission. Under that rule a difference in rates for similar ser-
vice to shippers from two different points to the same destination was not
unlawful unless the same carrier or carriers participated in the service
to both, and unless the carriers could be held individually responsible
for the discrimination, in the sense that it was possible for them to remove
it by their own acts. If the discrimination resulted from the independent
action of different carriers, then the shipper or locality was left without
a remedy, even as against a carrier which participated in both rates but
could control neither. The reason for this rule lay in the fact that the
Commission had no power to raise the rates of the independent carrier
to the preferred locality, nor could it reduce a reasonable rate to the
prejudiced locality.2 2 And a carrier serving both points could not remove
the discrimination by any act of its own so long as the independent rate
to the preferred locality remained. It must seem an irrelevant question
to the shipper suffering under a high rate, whether or not the carriers
serving both him and his more generously treated competitor are under
common control; but upon this fortuitous circumstance the Commission's
ability to help him then depended. Thus the absence of the minimum
rate power controlled the substantive definition of what unlawful dis-
crimination was. The recognition of this limitation was one of the
grounds originally urged by the Commission for the granting of the
minimum rate power.6
It is somewhat anomalous that the legislative history of the Trans-
portation Act gives little clue to the purposes Congress desired to serve
when it conferred the power to fix minimum rates on the Commission.
The prevention of rate wars, the removal of non-compensatory rates,
and the protection of weaker water carriers from ruthless railroads were
mentioned in the committee reports; it is not clear what other con-
siderations were thought of.' Discrimination by low intrastate rates,
the practice common to trunk lines of forcing high divisions of joint
rates from their short-line connections, and the protection of a rate
prejudice to Ashland on the ground that independent carriers served both points, and
since the Commison could not raise the rate from St. Louis, the Southern could not
cure the discrimination by any act of its own, either by adjusting its rates or by with-
drawing from the business.
22. Galloway Coal Co. v. Alabama G. S. Rr. Co., 40 I. C. C. 311, 315 (1916).
23. Return of Railroads to Private Ownership, Housm RronT, No. 456, 66th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1919), 10, 19, and remarks of Rep. Esch, 58 Co.,o. Rm 8654 (1919). Senator
Cummins briefly mentioned the power on the floor as an aid to weak connecting lines
in securing fair divisions of joint rates, 59 CoNG. RE.. 141 (1919); but that purpose was
adequately served by § 15 (6), New England Divisions Case, 261 U. S. 184 (1923).
Other incidental references to the power in the course of debate will be found in 59
CONG. Rm 364-5, 46S, 745 (1919).
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structure designed to provide an adequate revenue, had been urged as
reasons why Congress should give the Commission the minimum rate
power.24 But other sections of the Transportation Act dealt expressly
with these problems.2" No mention was made in Congress of the possible
effect of the grant of the power to fix minimum rates on the Ashland
rule, although that rule was responsible for the largest gap in the Com-
mission's control of railroad rate discrimination.
In the interpretation of the minimum rate power, the Commission was
soon confronted by the question of whether this new grant of additional
power effected a tacit repeal of the Ashland rule. For, although a finding
of discrimination provides a clearly appropriate basis for a minimum
rate order, such a finding can be made only if a violation of Section 3
is found to exist. Therefore, unless the grant of the minimum rate power
provided a new basis for a finding of discrimination under Section 3 by
abrogating the Ashland rule, it could not serve to close the gaps in the
Commission's control of discrimination. Valid grounds for holding that
this limitation should no longer be effective could have been inferred from
the terms of the statute, which seem clear and sweeping. Section 15 (1)
provides:
26
"Whenever . . . the Commission shall be of opinion that any . . .
rate . . . is or will be . . . unduly preferential or prejudicial . . . the
Commission is hereby authorized and empowered to determine and
prescribe what will be the just and reasonable individual or joint rate,
fare, charge, or rates, fares, or charges, to be thereafter observed in
such case, or the maximum or minimum, or maximum and minimum,
to be charged . . . and to make an order that the carrier or carriers
shall cease and desist from such violation . . . and shall not thereafter
publish . . . any rate . .. less than the minimum so prescribed ......
If the Commission finds a discrimination in the rates from two points
to the same destination, why can it not by a minimum rate order raise
the rate from the preferred locality offered by any independent carrier
from that point? If that were done, the ground for exempting any other
carriers participating in the discrimination would disappear. And with
the removal of the reason for the Ashland rule, the rule itself might be
repudiated. On the other hand, if the origin of the rule were forgotten,
then it might be said that the Transportation Act altered only the remedies
available, and not the definition of discrimination in Section 3. In that
case, preference and prejudice are still not "undue," so as to justify a
minimum rate order, unless responsibility can be placed upon individual
carriers.
24. Bi16, loc. cit. supra note 3.
25. 41 STAT. 484, 486, 488-91 (1920), 49 U. S. C. A. §§ 13 (4), 15 (6), 15a (2) (1926).
26. 41 STAT. 485 (1920), 49 U. S. C. A. § 15 (1) (1926).
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The Commission at first adhered to the Ashland rule; -7 then at the
behest of counsel for shippers in numerous cases and with apparent
encouragement from the Supreme Court,2 a majority moved gradually
to the more literal, and broader, interpretation of the Act. But when
a clear test case arose, the Commission was sharply told by the Supreme
Court in a five-to-four decision that the Ashland rule was still the law.P?
The result has been, therefore, that the minimum rate power has given the
commission a new remedy in its control of discrimination, but has
not affected the underlying definitions which condition the Commis-
sion's power in this field. 31 One practical effect of the power to fix
minimum rates upon the Commission's ability to control discrimination
27. Sugar Cases of 1922, 81 I. C. C. 448 (1923); Maritime Aas'n of Boston Chamber
of Commerce v. Ann Arbor Rr. Co., 95 I. C. C. 539 (1925); Lake Cargo Coal Rates, 1925,
101 L C. C. 513 (1925); Galveston Commercial Ass'n v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co.,
128 I. C. C. 349 (1927); Baltimore Chamber of Commerce v. Ann Arbor Rr. Co., 159 I.
C. C. 691 (1929).
28. The first case touching on the subject after the Transportation Act seemed to
negative any assumption of a change in § 3. "Carrier, ' snid Air. Justice Brandeis in
Central Rr. Co. of N. J. v. United States, 257 U. S. 247, 259 (1922), "can be held . . .
responsible for unjust disdrimination only if each carrier has participated in some way
in that which causes the unjust discrimination. ... What Congress Sought to prevent by
that section, as originally enacted, was not differences between localities in transportation
rates, . . . but unjust discrimination between them by the same carrier or carriers.
Neither the Transportation Act, 1920, . . . nor any earlier amendatory legislation has
changed, in this respect, the purpose or scope of sec. 3." But two years later he 'pohe
differently: "For now, the interests of the individual carrier must yield in many respects
to the public need . . . and the newly conferred power to grant relief against 'ates un-
reasonably low may afford protection against injurious rate policies of a competitor, which
were theretofore uncont)rollable." United States v. Illinois Central Rr. Co. 263 U. S. 515,
525 (1924). This attitude was continued in United States v. Pennsylvania Rr. Co., 266
U. S. 191 (1924); Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v. United States, 270 U. S. 287 (1926);
Virginian Ry. Co. v. United States, 272 U. S. 658 (1926), cases dealing mainly vith
switching practices. See MAZs m , Tim LA=a CAco Co.r, RAm Co'movMsY (1932)
c. 7, and comments cited note 2 suPra.
29. Oswego v. Baltimore & Ohio Rr. Co., 146 L C. C. 293 (1928), 151 L C. C. 717
(1929); Duluth Chamber of Commerce v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 156 I. C. C.
156 (1929); Inland Empire Manufacturers' Ass'n v. Abilene & Southern Ry. Co., 165 I.
C. C. 53 (1930); Lake Cargo Coal from Kentucky, 139 L C. C. 367 (1928). See also
Eastern Class Rate Investigation, 164 1. C. C. 314, 416 (1930). But cf. Wisconsin Bridge
and Iron Co. v. Illinois Terminal Co., 161 L C. C. 176, 179 (1930).
30. Texas and Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 289 U. S. 627 (1933), rev'g Galvton
Commercial Ass'n v. Galveston, H. S. A. Ry. Co., 160 I. C C. 345 (1929). Mr. Justice
Roberts wrote the opinion, with Mr. justice Brandeis among the dissenterms. See also 3B
Sharfman, loc. cit. supra note 3.
31. For instances of reductions cancelled because they would violate § 3, see Coal from
Detroit, Toledo, and Ironton Rr. Mines, 64 I. C. C. 564 (1921); Rail-and-water Rates from
Atlantic Seaboard, 63 I. C. C. 267 (1921); Salt from La. Mines to Chicago, 66 I. C. C.
81 (1922), 69 I. C. C. 312 (1922); Salt from C. F. A. to Western Trunk Line Destinations
74 L C. C. 409 (1922); Pig Iron from Southern Producing Points, 74 I. C. C. 330 (1922).
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may, however, be observed. Prior to 1920 it was thought necessary that
an alternative be allowed the carrier in complying with a Section 3 order:
that it must be permitted to elect whether it will raise the preferential
rate, or lower the prejudicial one, or strike an intermediate level for
both.32 A dictum in the Texas and Pacific Ry. case indicates indeed that
such is still the case if the remedial order is merely to "cease and desist"
from violating Section 3.33 But by proceeding to fix both maximum and
minimum at the same point, the Commission may determine the precise
level to which both rates must be adjusted.24 This is a considerable
advantage to the Commission, especially in fixing differentials.
A vaguer basis for using the power to raise rates is found in claims
that rates are unreasonably low in violation of Section 1, or too low
to provide the revenues necessary to support an "adequate transportation
system," as commanded by Section 15a."5  It is often impossible to
distinguish between these grounds in a decision of the Commission, since
an adequate return is one element in determining a "reasonable" rate."
Here the major difficulties in fixing minimum rates emerge. When the
Commission reduces a rate because it is unreasonably high, two sorts of
evidence are usually considered: the cost of the service, and comparisons
with other rates in the same territory or for similar services and under
similar transportation conditions, which are regarded as reasonable
maxima. These criteria are not readily applicable in fixing minimum
rates. In view of the difficulty of apportioning joint costs, and the
importance of the volume of traffic that will move at different rate levels,
one can seldom be dogmatic in asserting that any particular rate is so
low as not to be compensatory. Moreover, there is no large body of
rates approved as reasonable minima available for comparative purposes.,,
32. Detroit, G. H. & M. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm., 74 Fed. 803 (C. C.
A. 6th, 1896), aff'd 167 U. S. 633 (1897); American Express Co. v. Caldwell, 244 U. S.
617 (1917).
33. 289 U. S. 627, 650 (1933).
34. Id. at 650, n. 39.
35. For instances of reductions denied on these grounds, see Salt Cases of 1923, 92 1.
C. C. 388 (1924); Oil from Texas Ports, 63 I. C. C. 74 (1921); Coal from Wyoming Mines,
68 I. C. C. 254 (1922); Lake Cargo Coal from Kentucky, 139 I. C. C. 367 (1928); Trunk
Line & Ex-lake Iron Ore Rates, 69 I. C. C. 589, 610 (1922); Grain & Grain Products, 115
I. C. C. 153 (1926); Lake Cargo Coal from Kentucky, 139 I. C. C. 367 (1928); Cement
from Linwood, 140 I. C. C. 579 (1928); Coffee from New Orleans, 182 I. C. C. 453 (1932);
Jefferson City and North Jefferson, Mo., Rates, 213 I. C. C. 195 (1935). One of the few
cases where existing rates were raised for these reasons, as distinguished from reductions can-
celled, is Coal, Bituminous, Ex-river, from Colona and Conway, Pa. to Youngstown, Ohio,
197 I. C. C. 617 (1933) (Third Report), discussed infra.
36. Coal from Illinois to Keokuk, Iowa, 210 I. C. C. 395 (1935); cf. Express Merchan-
dise from Cincinnati, Ohio, to South, 210 L C. C. 89 (1935), in which the rates proposed
were deemed to violate all the crimes in the calendar.
37. 3B Sharfman, op. cit. supra note 3, at 628-629
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Nevertheless, the out-of-pocket cost of a particular service plus some
modest contribution to overhead, though not necessarily to profit, is evi-
dently one criterion of action. A finding that a rate is below the costs
of the service fairly allocable to it provides the clearest basis for a
minimum rate order. Although the Commission has several times re-
peated that the power should be "sparingly exercised," 38 and only where
necessary to avoid "substantial public injury,"3 nevertheless it has based
minimum rate orders on such findings in order to prevent the wasteful
depletion of carrier revenues, or to stop what might be regarded as a
concealed rebate.40  Until the Yozngstown case, the only minimum rate
order challenged in the courts was of this kind, and resulted in an
affirmance of the Commission's order.4
A variant of this criterion has been used to justify fixing a minimum
on a cost basis by a finding that a rate, though not actually below out-
of-pocket cost, is still so low that it tends to cause increases in other
rates of the same carrier. Such a rate relationship would not amount
to a discrimination which could be dealt with under Section 3 unless
the commodities, localities, or shippers involved were competitive, but it
would result in an inequitable distribution of the burden of filling the
carrier's treasury, and on that ground the low rate has been condemned
as unreasonable." This sort of finding necessarily contains subjective
elements. Thus, traffic may be classified according to its intrinsic value
and volume of movement, justifying a higher carload revenue return from
typewriters than from iron ore.43 Nevertheless, there can be little quarrel
with the use of the minimum rate power to prevent rates so low that
they impose a loss on the carrier proposing them, and thus burden its
other traffic.
We enter a more doubtful realm, when the minimum rate power is
invoked in cases where it is not seriously contended that the rates pro-
tested are below the cost of the service. Indeed, 11r. Justice Roberts,
in a dictum in the Texas and Pacific Ry. case, inferred that the power
38. Sugar Cases of 1922, 81 I C C. 44S %1923); Cloverdale Spring Co. v. Atlantic
Coast Line Rr. Co., 174 I. C. C. 133, 13S (1931); Iron and Steel Articles, 155 I. C. C.
517 (1929).
39. Alan Wood Steel Co. v. A. G. S. Rr. Co., 190 I. C. C. 3, 13 (1932); H. Mloffet Co.
v. Southern Pacific Co., 195 I. C. C. 198, 200 (1933).
40. Salt Cases of 1923, 92 I. C. C. 388 (1924); Salt from Utah to San Francisco 61 1.
C. C. 58 (1921); Coal from D. T. & I. Ri. Mlines, 69 I. C. C. 112, 113 (1922).
41. Jefferson Island Salt Mrining Co. v. United States, 6 F. (2d) 315 (N. D. Ohio
1925), sustaining Salt Cases of 1923, 92 I. C. C. 388 (1924).
42. Coal from Illinois to Keokuk, Iowa, 210 I. C. C. 395 (1935); Gasoline from San
Francisco Bay Points to Ogden, Utah, 198 I. C. C. 683 (1934), and see cases cited note
35 supra.




can not be used at all without such a cost finding.44 But neither protesting
carriers, nor the Commission, nor the Court itself in later cases, have
taken so restricted a view of the minimum rate power. They have instead
considered the argument that rates may be unlawful if they are enough
below the prevailing structure in that territory on the commodity involved
so as to threaten a disruption of that structure.48
Here the criteria are based upon what is thought to be reasonable
for the other carriers. The consequence of the threatened reduction may
be an undesirable diversion of the traffic from the lines now carrying it,
possibly from a weak line to a strong one, or vice versa,40 or from a
direct to a circuitous route; or it may be to provoke competitive reduc-
tions, which reduce carrier revenues all around-a rate war-and thus
tend to force increases in other rates on the other lines if the reduction
affects a major item of their traffic.47 When, as is often the case, the
rates in the structure sought to be protected are regarded as reasonable
maxima, the protested rate may still be well above the cost level, and
the effort is therefore being made to fix the reasonable maxima as the
measure of reasonable minima as well. This does violence to the usual
conception of a minimum rate as lying at the lower limit of a "zone
of reasonableness," and indicates that the real concern of the protestants
is over rate relationships, normally a Section 3 question, or over the
road's revenue from the general rate structure. But where the reduction
is established by an independent carrier, the Ashland rule makes Section
3 inapplicable, and the solution of the problem then necessarily turns upon
standards of reasonableness under Section 1.
Where rate relationships are the issue, the Commission has at times
toyed with a doctrine of "relative unreasonableness." There is a legiti-
mate scope for such a doctrine, in determining, solely by comparisons, the
reasonableness of a particular and unimportant rate in an established
structure, without stopping to inquire into the intrinsic reasonableness of
the whole structure.48 But the temptation in using the doctrine is to
compare the situations of the shippers, or of localities, rather than of the
carriers, and thus make Section 1 do what the Ashland rule prevents Sec-
tion 3 from accomplishing. Thus where the Commission is precluded
44. 289 U. S. 627 at 633 (1933).
45. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. United States, 295 U. S. 476 (1935).
46. Query, when is the maintenance and support of weak lines desirable? And in any
event, what are "weak" lines?
47. Ex-River Coal to Cleveland, Lorain and other Ohio Points, 185 I. C. C. 211 (1932);
Coal from Indiana to Illinois, 197 I. C. C. 249 (1933); 200 I. C. C. 609 (1934), rev'd
United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. Rr. Co. 294 U. S. (1935); cf. Blkl6, loc.
cit. supra note 3.
48. Wyoming Coal Co. v. Virginian Ry., 96 I. C. C. 359 (1925), 98 I. C. C. 488 (1925),
aff'd Virginian Ry. Co. v. United States, 272 U. S. 658 (1926); Chemical Line Co. v.
Bellefonte Central Rr. Co., 147 I. C. C. 285 (1928).
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from finding that a given difference in rates offered by two carriers results
in discrimination, it might nevertheless say that it is relatively unreason-
able to give one group of shippers rates on a basis lower than that enjoyed
by other shippers. This was what the Commission tried to do in the Lake
Cargo cases.49 It is true that the effects of rate differentials on competing
shippers, matters to which the Commission can hardly be blind, are essen-
tial elements in the proof of injury in discrimination cases. Yet to use
them as grounds of action under Section 1 would lodge in the Commission
a power of life and death over communities, to be exercised in the Com-
mission's discretion, which sounds too much like national economic plan-
ning to be openly avowed. 0 The doctrine of relative reasonableness has
not been extended since the Lake Cargo cases"1 and should be confined to
comparisons of the effects of rate adjustments upon carriers, not upon
shippers. Otherwise Section 3 becomes superfluous.
In judging a reduction by its effects on other carriers, the most impor-
tant element is of course its effect upon their revenue. Since the enact-
ment of Section 15a in 1920, the Commission has displayed an increasing
solicitude for the financial well-being of the railroads. If the railroads
still had a monopoly of the means of freight transportation, it might
theoretically be possible for the Commission to adopt a consistent and
scientific policy of controlling the total of railroad revenue by making
horizontal changes in the general level of all rates as occasion required,
leaving the adjustment of particular differentials to be settled by non-
revenue considerations.52  But no such simple task now confronts the
49. 139 I. C. C. 367 (1928). The Commission, after reducing the Yates on coal from
the northern fields and thereby widening an established differential, undertook by an
order under § 1, to prevent a competitive reduction from the southern fields which would
have restored the differential. The order was invalidated by a federal court on the grounds
that there was no basis for action under § 3, since the carriers involved were independent.
And considered as an action under § 1, the Commison had not relied upon transporta-
tion standards but had been actuated by a regard for the effect of the competitive re-
duction upon shippers in the northern fields, a criterion which it was stated the Com-
mission could not lawfully apply. Anchor Coal Co. v. United States, 25 F. (2d) 462
(S. D. W. Va. 1928), rev'd on other grounds, United States v. Anchor Coal Co., 279 U.
S. 812 (1929) (Mlem).
50. Mansfield, The Hoch-Smith Resolution and the Consideration of Commercial Con-
ditions in Rate Fixing (1931) 16 CoRm. L. Q. 339. Shulman, Book Review (1936) 45
YAL L. J. 558; Comment (1931) 40 YAr L. J. 60D.
51. But cf. Third Ex-River Case, 211 I. C. C. 1 (1935) discussed infra p. 1422.
52. This is to some degree the case. One may group together as "revenue" cases those
in which no attention was paid to rate relationships, such as the horizontal changes con-
sidered in the Five Per Cent Case, 31 I. C. C. 351 (1914), 32 L C. C. 325 (1914); In-
creased Rates, 1920, 58 I. C. C. 220 (1920); Reduced Rates, 1922, 63 L C. C 676, 73 I.
C. C. 189 (1922), 81 I. C. C. 170 (1923); The Fifteen Per cent Case, 1931, 178 I. C. C.
539 (1931), 179 I. C. C. 215 (1931), 191 I. C. C. 361 (1933); General Rate Level Investi-
gation, 1933, 195 L C. C. 5 (1933); Emergency Freight Charges, 1935, 203 I. C. C. 4 (1935),
and the Passenger Fare case, 214 I. C. C. 174 (1936). See 3B Sharfman, op. cit. supra note
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Commission. The reductions offered by railroads are piecemeal changes,
grudgingly given where the pinch is most felt, and generally in response
to competition from sources outside the Commission's control. The effects
of such reductions upon rail revenue must be considered in a similar
piecemeal fashion.
How far may the Commission usefully and wisely go in preventing a
rate reduction because of its revenue effect on neighboring carriers? That
question is the key to an effective minimum rate policy. It is important
at the outset to distinguish the source of the competition that compels the
reduction. It may arise merely in the desire of the carrier proposing
the reduction to get a larger share of the existing rail business. The
authors of the Transportation Act, having this in mind, supposed that
the minimum rate power would be needed to protect a weak carrier
against low rates offered by a strong competitor for the purpose of
putting the former out of business. Instances of such practice are not
unknown. 3  But the Commission's experience in attempting to conserve
revenues demonstrates that strong lines more often ask for protection from
the reckless competition of the weak."4 A rail line in receivership, or
one having a circuitous route so that it normally gets but little of the
traffic between two points, or an independent short line, may readily
desire to cut rates, the only effect of which will be to reduce the revenues
of the principal carriers without creating additional business. The
Commission frowns on such reductions," , 'although they would ob-
viously bring cheaper transportation costs to shippers. And a minimum
rate order to stop a reduction that does not go below the cost of the
service is a subsidy to the status quo, the justification for which must
3, at 33-221. A much larger number of cases, of which Bituminous Coal to C. F. A.
Territory, 46 I. C. C. 66 (1917) is typical, have dealt with comprehensive readjustments
of rate relationships without attempting to alter the total revenue to be derived, The
numerous investigations undertaken and readjustments ordered in Docket 17,000, in
response to the Hoch-Smith Resolution of 1925, 43 STAT. 801 (1925), 49 U. S. C. A. § 55
(1926) have attempted to do both. See the Commission's annual reports for summaries
of actions taken.
53. United States v. Illinois Central Rr. Co., 263 U. S. 515 (1923), aff'g Swift Lumber
Co. v. Fernwood & Gulf Rr. Co., 61 I. C. C. 485 (1921).
54. It also demonstrates that there are other ways of conserving carrier revenues than
by keeping the tate level high. But the unnecessary dissipation of carrier resources in con-
cessions and allowances to large shippers, favoritism in purchases of materials, speculation
in the stock of other carriers, etc., is irrelevant here except as it affects the wisdom or
necessity of allowing the resultant losses to be taken out of the shippers. See the Com-
mission proceedings in Ex parte 104, Practices Affecting Operating Revenue of CarrIevs,
198 I. C. C. 134 (1933), 209 I. C. C. 11 (1935), 201 I. C. C. 323 (1934); Ann. Reps, I.
C. C. 1933, 29, id. 1934 at 24, 26-28, id. 1935 at 27; REPORTS OP THE FEDERAL COORmNATOR
or TRANSPORTATION. See also LowENTrAL, TuE INVESTOR PAYS (1933).
55. Coal from Illinois to Keokuk, Iowa, 210 I. C. C. 395 (1935); Jefferson City and
North Jefferson, Mo., Rates, 213 I. C. C. 195 (1935).
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depend upon balancing the advantage to the shippers against the imme-
diate necessities of the carriers.
Where the competition that compels the reduction comes from a source
beyond the Commission's effective control, a graver question arises, and
the wisdom of using the minimum rate power is much more doubtful.
Such competition 'may come from highway vehicles, from waterways,
or from private or wholly intrastate rail lines." The growth of trucking
and the inroads it has made on freight traffic are too well known to
require extended comment. Nor does the new Motor Carrier Act of
1935 promise to alter the situation materially. Although it purports to
give the Commission power to fix minimum rates on common and con-
tract carriers by motor,5" a power which might in theory be used to
keep highway rates up near the rail level, this authority falls far short
of the power necessary to an effective control of truck competition. In
fact, these provisions do not seem capable of practical administration.
If minimum rates for common or contract motor carriers are fixed sub-
stantially above their cost on any important items of truck traffic it
may be predicted, with some confidence, that the shippers will truck
their own goods as private carriers, not subject to regulation."3 Water-
ways have developed in a similar if less spectacular manner.rO When
the Transportation Act was written, water borne traffic was confined
largely to coastwise and Great Lakes shipping. Today, these facilities
have expanded greatly, and in addition river navigation has been improved
by the expenditure of vast sums, so that water transportation is available
at many inland points. 0 The only water carriers now subject to the
Commission's jurisdiction are those controlled by railroads, mainly coast-
wise lines. Private or wholly intrastate railroads, exempted from control
by the Interstate Commerce Act, are not numerous, but where they exist
they may be safe against trunk line rail competition. Together, these
alternative carriers by providing a definitely cheaper service have largely
destroyed the monopoly position of the railroads, even in the carriage
of heavy basic commodities,"' and promise more active competition in
56. It may come also from intrastate reductions imposed on intertate carriers by
zealous state commissions. Unless effective truck competition is also prezent, Euch 'reduc-
tions are well within the Comission's control under § 13.
57. MorTo C~au= Acr, 49 STAT. 559, 562, 49 U. S. C. A. §§ 316(e), 318 (b) (1935).
58. Another factor is the practical impossibility of federal policing of the rates actually
paid to a multitude of contract carriers.
59. In § 500 of the Transportation Act, the Commission was instructed not to prej-
udice water transportation by its policies. 41 STAT. 499 (1920), 49 U. S. C. A. § 142
(1926).
60. It may be that one of the most important economic consequences of the TVA
will be to force a reduction of rail rates by subsidizing water transportation.
61. Airplane transportation, impoi'tant for consideration of passenger, mail, and some
express service, threatens little damage to railroad freight traffic.
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the near future.62 Even now they have transformed many elaborately
classified railroad tariff schedules into meaningless paper rates 8
The Commission thus faces an embarrassing dilemma when it considers
issuing a minimum rate order on revenue grounds to protect the existing
rail rate structure from unregulated competitors. If the order is issued,
the rate structure may be preserved but the quantity of rail traffic will
decline. There is little reason to believe that the shippers of the country
as a whole will continue to use an expensive means of transportation
when cheaper means are available. And there are no profits in paper
rates. Hence the very purpose of the particular minimum order, to
conserve the carrier revenues, is defeated. Moreover, the Commission
in adopting such a course would only be postponing the inevitable process
of readjustment to a lower price level in freight transportation similar to
that which it is now forcing the railroads to undergo in a belated effort
to recapture the passenger traffic of a decade ago. 4 But on the other
hand, if a minimum order is not issued, what becomes of the notion that
the revenue needs of a group of carriers are a sufficient basis for pre-
venting rate reductions by one of their number? Two recent cases
illustrate the Commission's difficulties. In one, the reduction move-
ment was started by an order of the Illinois Commerce Commission
reducing intrastate rates on coal shipped to northeastern Illinois mines
within the state. In a Thirteenth Section proceeding initiated by the
Milwaukee railroad, which served the same consumers from Indiana coal
districts, the Interstate Commerce Commission refused to restore the in-
trastate rates affected by the order of the Illinois Commission." Reduc-
tions to the same destinations from western Kentucky followed and were
approved by the Commission. Thereupon the Milwaukee sought to
restore the previous differentials by cutting its rates from Indiana, but
the Commission called a halt. 6 It found that the whole structure needed
overhauling, that these piecemeal reductions endangered rail revenues,
and it intimated that the Milwaukee had perhaps been enjoying too large
a share of the business anyway. In Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paid
Rr. Co. v. United States0 7 this order drew a sharp rebuke from the
Supreme Court, and it was held invalid for want of the findings necessary
62. § 3 causes the railroads to move slowly in offering reductions to meet this competi-
tion, since the eductions must usually be generalized to avoid discrimination.
63. As an illustration of paper rates on which no traffic moves, a single freight car
daily each way now carries all the less-than-carload freight handled by the New Haven
Railroad between New York and Boston. Yet pages and pages of filed tariffs of the road
are devoted to rates on minutely classified 1. c. 1. traffic.
64. Passenger Fare case, 214 I. C. C. 174 (1936), 215 1. C. C. 350 (1936).
65. Intrastate Rates on Bituminous Coal in Illinois, 182 I. C. C. 537 (1932).
66. Coal from Indiana to Illinois, 197 I. C. C. 245 (1933), 200 I. C C. 609 (1934).
67. 294 U. S. 499 (1935).
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to support it. The Court pointed out that the Commission had not found
either that the rates were non-compensatory, or that they jeopardized
the carrier's capacity for service. The Commission had decided, as Mr.
Justice Cardozo put it, that:6 s
"The schedules are to be congealed as they exist, because if not
congealed they will be fluid, fluidity is change, and change has the
potency, if not the promise, of disturbance .. . this and hardly more is
the teaching of the report."
In answer, he said: 9
"Every change of a rate schedule, either voluntary or involuntary, is
a disruption pro tanto of the rate structure theretofore prevailing. Plainly
such a disruption without more is no sufficient reason for prohibiting a
change."
It is not clear, however, whether this decision was intended merely to
tighten up Commission procedure, or to define the criteria of unreason-
ableness warranting a minimum order. If the court aimed merely at the
first objective, the case is not significant for this discussion, except to
the degree that it may compel the Commission in the future to be more
precise in stating what- statutory grounds it is invoking in minimum rate
cases. If, however, the court was attempting to formulate standards for
the exercise of the minimum rate power, it seemed to announce a doctrine
that the Court itself was unwilling to follow a few months later in the
Youngstown case. In the Milwaukee case, the court said:70
"There is no suggestion in the report that the rates have been so
reduced as to be less than compensatory ... they do not pass the minima
beyond which charges are too low. A zone of reasonableness exists
between maxima and minima within which a carrier is ordinarily free to
adjust its charges for itself."
The Youngstown case is more instructive. It arose out of a long-
standing controversy between western Pennsylvania coal operators and
their trunk line carriers over the movement of coal in the Pittsburgh
district.71 In 1927 the Pittsburgh, Lisbon & Western Railroad, a short
interurban, south of Youngstown, controlled indirectly by the Pittsburgh
Coal Company, asked the Commission for a certificate of public con-
venience and necessity to construct two branches, one north to Youngs-
town and the other south to the Ohio River, to permit the movement
of coal from river mines in the Pittsburgh district by barge and rail to
Youngstown. The Lisbon suggested a rate of 77 cents for its rail haul
68. Id., at 50S. 69. Id., at 507.
70. Id. at 506, citing the Texas & Pacific and Illinois Central cases, supra notes 30 and
53.
71. Some of the details of this struggle are related in MAsn, Trm LAim CnGo Co.AL
RATE CoN Rovmsy (1932) 39-40.
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by the new route7 2 the river phase of the trip promised to cost not
more than 25 or 30 cents a ton. The application was of course opposed
by the trunk lines which carried coal all-rail from Pittsburgh to Youngs-
town at $1.34 a ton. The Commission found that a river-rail route
was justified, and at the rate proposed, but denied the Lisbon's applica-
tion on the ground that the trunk lines could provide a similar service at
less capital and operating cost by constructing transfer facilities at the
points where they cross the river.73 These lines responded by proposing
a rate of $1.02 for the rail part of the contemplated route, which was
suspended by the Commission in the First Ex-river case and cancelled
as unreasonably high, without prejudice to the establishment of a rate
of 77 cents.74 The lower rate was not put into effect by the carriers until
two years later, after the Wheeling and Lake Erie, an independent line,
had published ex-river rates at a still lower level to points beyond
Youngstown. The Wheeling and Lake Erie's rates were raised by the
Commission in the Second Ex-river case, 75 to 77 cents plus the usual
destination differentials between Youngstown and the points involved,
indicating a continued reliance on that rate as reasonable. The Lisbon,
however, proceeded with its extensions on the theory that it was an
intrastate carrier without the Commission's jurisdiction." In the mean-
time, the Ohio Commission inaugurated a series of reductions on intrastate
coal movements. These were finally restored to the previous level in a
Thirteenth Section proceeding,77 and on the same day the Ex-River cases
were reopened, leading to a third decision which raised the previous
maximum reasonable rate of 77 cents to a minimum reasonable rate of
90 cents to Youngstown-almost to the ail-rail scale.78  The new rates
were not defended at all on the basis of cost,70 but quite frankly as
72. It estimated that the costs for this haul are between 50 and 60 cents per ton.
73. Construction of Branches by Pittsburgh, Lisbon & Western Rr. Co., 150 I. C. C.
43 (1928) ; 150 I. C. C. 619 (1929). As a negative order, it was not judicially reviewable,
Piedmont & Northern Ry. Co. v. United States, 280 U. S. 469 (1930).
74. Coal, Bituminous, Ex-River, from Colona and Conway, Pa. to Youngstown, Ohio,
163 I. C. C. 3 (1930). For the .distance of 43 miles, ton mile earnings would amount to
23.7 mills on the rate of a $1.02, and to 17.9 mills for the 77-cent rate. Eithebr of these
earning figures is very high for movements of coal in substantial volume.
75. Ex-River Coal to Ohio Points, 185 I. C. C. 211 (1932).
76. Part of the construction was done by the Youngstown & Suburban Rr. Co., an
interurban not subject to the Commission's jurisdiction, which, with the Lisbon, was con-
trolle4 by the Pittsburgh Coal Co. Cf. Youngstown and Suburban Ry. Co., Operation,
Fin. Docket 8928, 175 I. C. C. 699 (1931).
77. Intrastate Rates on Bituminous Coal within Ohio, 192' I. C. C. 413 (1933), sub-
sequently sustained in Ohio v. United States, 292 U. S. 498 (1934). The original order
was modified, 192 I. C. C. 734 (1933), 203 I. C. C. 411 (1934), 208 I. C. C. 671 (1935).
78. Coal, Bituminous, Ex-River from Colona and Conway, Pa., to Youngstown, 197
I. C. C. 617 (Third Report) (1933).
79. Despite the Supreme Court's assumption to the contrary in its decision of the case.
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relatively reasonable and necessary to protect the all-rail rate structure.
There was also a finding of discrimination as between originating mines
at river points and inland, but as appeared later, this was a make-weight
argument. The Supreme Court nevertheless upheld the Commission
in a brief opinion, against the contentions that the findings were in-
sufficient and unsupported by evidence8
It is difficult to reconcile this decision with the Court's dictum in the
Texas and Pacific case, or with the decision in the Milwaukee case. It
is possible to dismiss the former as being simply dictum. The latter
can be distinguished by arguing that it actually held nothing as to the
substantive grounds for a minimum rate order but dealt with the form
of Commission procedure; or by saying that in the Youngstown case
the Court took seriously the ground of discrimination which it ignored
in the Milwaukee case. In any event the Court in the Youngstown case
supported the Commission in wiping out any "zone of reasonableness"
between maximum and minimum rates. What was attempted here, in
effect, was to freeze the structure at the all-rail level, to assimilate the
cheaper ex-river route to the higher-cost rate structure. Evidently the
Commission at first defined reasonableness in terms of the differences
in cost, and then, out of concern for trunk line revenues, changed its
mind and defined it relatively in terms of the existing all-rail structure.81
In order to protect the all rail revenue, the Commission changed its earlier
attitude toward the fact that the barge-rail route offered a definitely
cheaper service, the benefits of which, it then thought, ought to be passed
along to the shippers. The sequel brings into sharp relief the difficulties
inherent in fixing minimum rates above cost. Two uncontrolled competi-
tors have appeared. The first is trucking. When the surcharge imposed
by Emergency Freight Charges, 1935S1 was applied to the ex-river as
well as to the all-rail rate, the Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. confronted
the trunk line carriers with a contract for the hauling of ex-river coal,
offered for signature by a trucking concern, which the shipper proposed
to accept unless the surcharge was removed. The carriers capitulated.
Although the removal of the surcharge would not violate the minimum
See Brief for Appellants 29, 30, Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. United States, 295 U. S.
476 (1935).
So. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. United States, 295 U. S. 476 (1935). The
opinion of the three-judge court sustaining the Commislon's order is reported in 7 F.
Supp. 33 (N. D. Ohio 1934). The merits were not seriously considered and most of the
opinion was devoted to the right of the shippers to appeal from the Co-1mkon's order.
Cf. Skinner & Eddy Cop. v. United States, 249 U. S. 557 (1919).
80a. Note that in the Second Ex-River case, supra note 75, where the proposed reductions
were more drastic, the commission used the 77th ex-river rate to Younstown (supposedly a
maximum rate, but lower than the all-rail rate) as the basis for the minimum 'ate there
fixed.
81. 208 I. C. C. 4 (1935).
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order which had been established before the surcharge was applied, it
did spread the differential between the ex-river and all-rail rates which
had been fixed by the Commission in the Third Ex-River case, on the
basis of alleged discrimination existing as between the river and inland
lines. The trunk lines appealed to the Commission and it withdrew the
finding of discrimination upon which the Court's approval of the minimum
order had in part rested.82 Thus by eating its own words hastily and
unceremoniously the Commission staved off for the time being the threat
of barge-truck carriage to the all-rail traffic in western Pennsylvania coal.
It was less successful in averting competition from the second service.
The Lisbon route was constructed, as has been said, without the Com-
mission's approval. The Pittsburgh Coal Company now takes coal from
its river mines to the Ohio shore by barge, and then by its own private
railroad to a washing plant six miles inland. There it is sold and its
transportation to Youngstown via the Lisbon, an intrastate common
carrier subject only to the Ohio Commission, begins. The Supreme
Court has just sanctioned the arrangement as outside the jurisdiction
allowed the Interstate Commerce Commission by the Transportation Act,83
over the protest of the trunk lines that this maneuvering is all part of
a single interstate movement. Moreover, the Court sustained the Ohio
Commission's control of the terms upon which the trunk lines must switch
the Lisbon's cars over their tracks upon arrival in Youngstown.84 No
figures on the cost of the movement from the mines to the washing plant
are available, but they are evidently low, and for the rest of the haul
the rates are controlled by a commission that is not interested in main-
taining the all-rail rate structure in Ohio at its present level. In a
further attempt to bring this route under its control, the Interstate
Commerce Commission at the request of the trunk lines has just announced
an investigation of the Lisbon under the commodities clause,8 5 but the
decision of the Supreme Court at the end of the present term in United
States v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co.80 would seem to block that
approach as well. Thus to the extent that Youngstown consumers care
82. Coal, Bituminous, Ex-River, from Colona and Conway, Pa. to Youngstown, Ohio,
211 I. C. C. 1 (1935).
83. Pennsylvania Rr. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 3 U. S. L. Week, April
28, 1936, at 827, col. 1.
84. Ibid.
85. New York Times, May 19, 1936, at 33, col. 7. On charges by the trunk line rail.
roads of violations of the "commodities clause," [34 STAT. 585 (1906), 49 U. S. C. A. § 1
(8) (1926)] and of discrimination, the Commission has ordered an investigation of the
practices of the Youngstown and Suburban, the Pittsburgh, Lisbon & Western, and the
Montour Railroads, all controlled by the Pittsburgh Coal Co., which in turn is dominated
by Mellon interests. Docket No. 27402, with which Fin. Docket 8928 was consolidated for
rehearing, beginning June 22, 1936.
86. 3 U. S. L. Week, May 26, 1936, at 991, col. 3.
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to rely on the largest coal operator in Pittsburgh for their supply, they
need pay neither the all-rail nor the ex-river trunk line rates. It seems
unlikely therefore that the Commission's solicitous protection of the
all-rail rate structure in Ohio can be indefinitely continued.
The discussion suggests two general inferences by way of conclusion.
First, the Commission may use the several phases of its minimum rate
power to cure discrimination, especially by fixing differentials. The gap
in this field established by the Ashlnd rule remains unchanged by the
enactment of the minimum rate power, and limits the Commission's action
to cases where carriers can be held individually responsible. But all
the recognized categories of rate discrimination are within the scope of
the minimum rate power. Second, in basing a minimum order on a
finding that a rate is unreasonably low, the Commission has adopted, and
the Supreme Court has sanctioned, criteria that go beyond what can be
safely used in practice. The Commission may properly act to prevent
rate reductions below cost, either to the carrier that initiates them or in
some circumstances to its rail competitors; or reductions which result
merely in an uneconomic diversion of traffic from one line to another;
or which threaten a too sudden and drastic, or ill-distributed loss of
revenue to a group of carriers. The cost of service is a standard accept-
able if not precise; service below it can hardly fail to be at the expense
of stockholders or, more likely, of other traffic. But the Commission
is on dangerous ground in fixing minimum rates substantially above cost,
for no other reason than the protection of a given rate structure. Such
action is a public recognition of a vested right in particular carriers to
the traffic involved, which the Commission cannot enforce as against
other than interstate railroads nor easily justify on grounds of policy.
It is a public subsidy of those carriers and an invitation to cheaper,
unregulated carriers to help themselves to another slice of the railroad
cake. A cheaper cost of railroad service and a progressively cheaper
price for it to shippers, is a sounder answer to carrier competition than
a minimum rate order.
1936] 1425
